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ABSTRACT 
The current governance model is a fundamental change in the corporate culture, 
given the constant change and globalization of markets, it serves to strengthen 
the organizational structure of the company, particularly Mexican small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) are more vulnerable to change, what comes the 
interest of "Analyze corporate governance as a competitive strategy in SMEs of 
Mexico" under the assumption that SMEs are more competitive by adopting 
management as corporate governance, and if not adopted this strategy, the 
company may be displaced from the national or international market. As a result 
the long term, this strategy aims to create social and economic welfare of SMEs, 
being labor strength in Mexico. 
Key words:competitiveness, corporate culture, corporate governance, SMEs. 
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RESUMEN 
El modelo de gobierno corporativo actual mente es fundamental como cambio en 
la cultura empresarial, dada la globalización y el cambio constante de los 
mercados, pues sirve para afianzar la estructura organizacional de la empresa, 
en particular las pymes mexicanas que son más vulnerables al cambio, por lo 
que surge el interés de “Analizar el gobierno corporativo como estrategia 
competitiva en las pymes de México”, bajo los supuestos de que las pymes son 
más competitivas al adoptar su gestión como gobierno corporativo; y si no se 
adopta esta estrategia, la empresa podrá ser desplazada del mercado nacional o 
internacional. Como resultado a largo plazo, esta estrategia pretende generar 
bienestar social y económico de las pymes, al ser fortaleza laboral en México. 





Today, society is undergoing a continuous transformation process, reflected in the 
economic, political and social. Thiscoupled withglobalization, characterized by cultural 
integration, and governmentmarkets, where there are involvedfactorsas important 
astechnologicalinnovationthroughresearchand development, leading to increased 
competitionamong employers, some bysurviveand othersto maintaina strong position, 
changes in which must beconstantly changingstrategiesfor the benefitof the organization. 
One of the biggest impactscaused byglobalization has beenthe freemarket entry, since 
previouslya firmcouldremain stable andpositionedat national level,but once it started the 
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globalization phase, initiallywasa competitive advantagefor thosefirms that hadvisionto 
growand had theopportunity to do so, but at the sametime has beena threatfor thosewho did 
not havethetechnology and capital todo the same. 
Thereforeit emergesthe importance of addressingthe use ofcorporate governanceas a 
strategy inMexican small and medium enterprises (SMEs) andas a waynot onlyto survive, 
butto competeand evenexpand theirhorizonsinternationally. So SMEsshould havean 
organizational structurethat allowsan orderlyadaptto global change.There are companies 
thatalready implementcorporate governanceas a means tocreate competitive 
advantages, and have markedmajordifferences fromthose thathave not. 
This documentwas developed through aqualitative study ofthe characteristicsthat should 
beadoptedby small andmedium enterprises inMexico, to generategreater competition, 
greater wealth andgreater economic,political and socio-cultural. Tothis end,forthe 
theoreticalframework is consideredtheagency theory, such as motivatingthe creation and 
operationof corporate governance.Consideringthe objective of this paper is to analyze 
corporate governanceas a competitive strategyinSMEs inMexico. 
Understanding thatfor changeand adoptionofcorporate governancerequires changes 
ofdirectors, managers,among other majorradical changes, so that they areawareof 
takingthe right decisionsandsafeguard the interests ofthe company. These changes 
allowthe consolidation of positioning in the market. Considering thatmany of 
thefamiliarMexican SMEs, the impact would bevery favorable andthe changesare 
urgentbecausestudies claimthe convenienceof going toconsultancies, universities, 
incubators and government institutionsthat provideenablingdeveloping business. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Evolutionof SMEs inMexico 
Mexican companieshave been affectedsince the 40's due toprotectionist trade policies, 
which led tocreateincentive 
systems,biasedandprejudicedgreatlycompetitiveness,causinga lagin the countryitselfthat 
beginstorootbeforethe opening of markets to foreign trade. This motivatedto switch 
toanexchange-free policy. However, ithadalsofailuresbecauseit exposedmainly smalland 
medium enterprises, whichdid not havethe resources needed toadapt and surviveto the 
changeinordinatethat was given. 
It was not untilthesecondworld war,when it was decided to openinternational markets 
andit is whenMexicolooks like a greatopportunity to exportits products primarilyto the 
neighboring countryUnited Statesfor the years50's and 60's, which brought a boomnot 
only forMexicobut toLatin America.At this time, after the Second World War (WW2), 
Mexicohad builta strong industry. However did not last longdue to the protectionand 
subsidies, which created huge distortionsintheeconomy.Herethe governmentintervenedto 
"support" businesses, causing the protection andgovernment subsidies.Because of this, 
the employer had acaptive marketand had nointerest in improvingthe quality oftheir 
products andservices as well asto exportthemor seeknew marketsand resulting that the 
economy stagnatedandwould causea deficitin the balancecommercial. 
Fromthis background, SMEs (small andmedium enterprises)have 
facedconstantobstaclesto surviveand make inroadsin international business. However 
this situation has been verydifficult for them.Globalization has createdgreat 
opportunitiesespecially inthe field ofglobalcompetitiveness. Followingthe opening of 
bordersfor entryof all types ofproducts and services,there was a declinein production 




The trendof Mexican businessmandoingbusinessfamilyheritageis reflectedin mostSMEs. 
Itwas unveiledat the International Seminaronthe Role ofMSMEsin the Process 
ofGlobalization of theWorldEconomy, held inMexicoCityin 1993. 
Mexicocurrentlyconsistsmainly ofmicro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs)andthey 
are of vitalimportance, since they formthe98.79% of the Mexican economy. Gutiérrez 
Peñaloza(2003, p. 12-13)points out thatthe countryhas an alternative which isin the 
creation ofa new corporate culturebased primarily onemployee motivationinits creativity, 
trust, loyalty, work, initiative and enthusiasm,achievedthrough ahealthyworking 
environment.This alternativeis urgently neededto be adopted in SMEs, due to 
theimportance tothe country. 
 
Featuresof SMEs inMexico 
As mentioned above, SMEs arethe economic centerof the country.This is 
becausesocialovercrowdingand the need toraise capitalandtechnical resourcesfor 
operating productionand services. However,despitethe complex rulesof management,it 
hasbeen improvingthe level of perfection. SMEs havethe peculiarity thatnotallresearch, 
planningoruse acomprehensive methodology. Therefore,policiesare 
complexfunctionsdepending on the typeofcompany, besidescultural,educational, political, 
economic and social aspects. 
RodriguezValencia (1994, page 26)states that from the point of view of the individual, a 
small businessmay seem insignificant, but in itsoverallsizeis really great,not only 
innumbers butbyits contribution to theeconomy.The size of theSMEis not 
measuredsolelyby the number offirms. It is also thecapitalinvestment,production, value 
added, number of jobs created, to name a fewfactorsthat give rise todetermine 
thecomplexity andat the same timethe importance ofSMEsin generating 
employmentandwealth to the country. The followingTable 
1showsthesizedistributioncompanies: 
 
Table1: Distribution offirmsby size 
TYPEOFCOMPANY NUMBER % 
Micro 2 605 849 95.5 
Small 87 285 3.2 
Median 25 517 .09 
Large 7 715 .03 
Totals 2 726 366 99.9 
Source: INEGI(2010) 
 
Some characteristicsof SMEsare:little or noexpertisein the administration, lack of access 
to capital,close personalcontactbetweenmanager 
andemployees,somedominantpositioninthe consumer marketandthe close 




APPROACH ANDDELIMITATION OF THE PROBLEM 
The research aims tohighlight theimportance ofMexican SMEsfromstrategicallyto 
adoptcorporate governance,to be competitive andhave a positive impacton the economic 
developmentof the country.The questionthat arises fromthedifficulty forSMEsto 





The research objective of this paper is to analyze corporate governanceas a competitive 
strategyinSMEs inMexicounder thesupportoftheagency theory. 
 
Research assumptions 
Theproblems detected, leads totwo cases. These are: 
1)SMEs aremore competitiveby adoptingmanagement ascorporate governance. 
2) If it isadopted acorporate governancestrategytypeis easy tomove thecompany in 
thedomestic or international market. 
 
JUSTIFICATION 
SMEs inMexicomostlyhaveneither advice norenough technology tobe 
competitive.SMEslack of resourcesandskilled human 
capitalforbusinessdevelopmentanddecision makingto strengthen the businessand the 
lackof information andvisionof entrepreneurs.It is then,that SMEsarecurrentlyinvolvedin a 
global market, which encourages companiestostreamlinetheir processes,train their staff, 
adviceto improvethe performance offirms, as well as make useof the technologies. These 
aspectsserve tomake the companycompetitive.Lack of informationcan affectthe degreeof 
being affectedintheir yields,prices andcosts, consequently, become uncompetitive. 
Afactor that also influencesthe lack ofmonitoringprocesses anddecisions madeby 
thegovernancetripodwhich iscomprised ofthe board, owners and managers(Peng, 2010). 
Mexicohas gonefrom beinga closed economy, with inwardgrowth,into a countrywitha new 
modelofoutward growththroughindustrialization andexport.The former modelwas 
effectivefroml940to 1980, to which was followed by the1982 crisisbecause 
ofoverprotectionin exports and over regulationgeneratedmonopoliesand oligopolies, there 
was little international competitiveness(Villarreal Villarreal& Ramos, 2001). Forthe years 
90's,the industrial modelwasbooming.Mexico currently exportsalmost 80% of its 
production, however, has notdiversifiedmodelsto other partsof the world,because ithas 
focused onthe United States andCanada, andthe percentagedecreasesfor 
othercountriesalso haveopportunity to exploitandcompeteas well aswe will generate 
astabilityin these times offinancial and economicvolatility(Ministry of Economy, 2013). 
Corporate governancecan improve the understandingof the structures andgovernance 
mechanismsthat benefit theoperation of the organization. Peng(2010) defines 
governance as the determination ofthe general usesto whichorganizational resourcesare 
deployedand the resolution ofconflicts 
betweenmultipleparticipatingorganizations.Corporate governance focuses onthe control 
of theexecutivepersonnel interestand the protection ofthe interestsof shareholders 
inenvironmentswhereorganizationalseparate ownershipand control.  
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One of the biggestimpacts thatglobalizationhas generatedhasbeen creatingmore risk, in 
the sense ofa morevolatile and competitive, but alsomore opportunitiesin terms of 
theemergence ofmore markets.Severalcauseslead thecompaniesto redefinetheir culture 
andadopt aninternationalbusinessthat allowseasyadaptation to changeand competemore 
successfullyand welfare. 
This new cultureofcorporate governancestands outin-depth assessment of managersand 
honestytosustain thebusiness, i.e.really care aboutthe customers, shareholders and 
employees, and assessorganizational levels, the delegationof responsibility 
andavoidbureaucracyforming multi functionalworking teams, seeking an atmosphereof 
trust and communicationwithin the organization. This isa result of thepresence of 
aseniorleadership inenablingto promotegood managementdecision-makingfor betterand 
faster results. 
MexicanSMEsare at a disadvantagein relationto large companieshoggingdemand, so 
they (SMEs) are displacedon automatic. This is the motive that explains whythey arein 
urgent needto adaptandadjustto the current environment handledglobally, which will 
enable to be more competitive.This impliesa change in attitudeto maintainmarket 
leadership, then.When buying a good in theglobal market, no matter the placeof origin, 
Argentina, Mexico or China, the important thing is to meetdemandpreferencesand top 
withqualitystandardsand marketingprocess. 
Currently,SMEs competedifferently. Companies can succeedif they masterfirst at the 
waysto compete andovercomenormalorganizationalbarriers, doingthings in adifferentway, 
beingflexibleto change andadapt to it.This leadsto aneworganizationalcultureof the 90'sto 
the presenthasbeenanchorfor change and 
improvement(GutiérrezPeñaloza,2003).Corporate governanceis based ontools usedfor 
efficientadministrative managementsuch ascoaching, benchmarking, management 
byvalues, empowerment, six sigma, quality function deployment, thebalanced scorecard, 
to name a few. 
 
Why implementcorporate governancein SMEs? 
To implementcorporate governancehelpsinstitutionalizethe operationof the company, 
giving it greater professionalismfor decision-making and daily management.Some ofthe 
benefits generated bythe companyare: 
1) Have access topublic / private financeon better termsand conditions. 
2) It canmake betterbusiness decisionsby the existenceof timely,accurateand 
relevantfinancial reportsfromgenerating. 
3) There isa clear identificationof the levels ofauthority and responsibility. 
4) Itbecomes clearto third partiesand internal staff. 
5) Helps improvesuccessionprocessesgenerational change. 
6) Measurethe operation andbetterbusiness performance. 
7) Promotesrisk managementof the company. 
 







THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
It is currentlyundergoingcontinuous changes inrelation to thebusiness and social world, 
which is whycompanieshave changed theirrole and significance, becoming a 
factorofchangeand social influence. For further study, read Limón Suárez, 2006 and 
Koontz &Weihrich, 1998).Dr.PilarBaptista, cited byLimónSuárez(2004) conducted a 
recent studyto define the profileof SMEsandthe outstandingresultsare that they 
aregenerallydirectedby the owner andthatin turn arewho serve asadministrator 
andcentralizeddecision maker. 
For the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Organización para la 
Cooperación y el DesarrolloEconómico, OECD,1999), corporate governance refers 
totheinternal means bywhich corporationsare operated 
andcontrolled.Tobeproperlyimplemented, corporate governance helps to ensurethat 
corporationsuse their resourcesefficiently.So it can be saidthat corporate governanceis a 
meanstoachievethe lead and controlthe company, in such a way that allow knowingthe 
rights and responsibilitiesof people whomake up the organization, making it possible to 
establishobjectives, procedures, policies and standards withto improvedadministrative 
management andcan becomecompetitivein the market. Deloitte&Touche(2013) show a 
modelof corporate governanceincluding theparties thereto, and the responsibilitiesand 
rightsof each ofthem. 
 
 





With the interactionofthe parts of thecorporate governance, itleads tointernal 
conflictscaused bydifferencesof interest andinformation asymmetries.Theinterest is 
focused onSMEs, because of its importance in the economyas they aregeneratingwealth 
in thecountry,covering98.7% of the totalnationalcompanies, and generate 45%of GDP 
(INEGI, 2010). Thisimplies thatgreater attentionmust be givento the promotionof 
technological developmentand competitivenessin theglobal market.The absenceof 
structural reforms thatare neededto sustainand supportis causinga steady loss 
ofcompetitiveness. 
That is whyresearchers in the fieldof corporate governancehave the opportunityto directly 
influencecorporate governancepracticesthroughthe carefulintegration of theoryand 
empirical research. Madhok(2002), argues that a theory of the businessstrategyshould 
addressnotonlythedecision onhierarchicalgovernanceormarket governance, but 
alsoshouldtake into account howa company'sresourcesand capabilitiescanbe 
betterdeveloped and deployedinthe pursuit ofcompetitive advantage.  
Theagency theoryis the one whogives riseto the studyof corporate governance.Some of 
theexpert authorswho have made greatcontributions to the subjectare Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, &Johnson, 1998andShleifer&Vishny, 1997. Jensen &Meckling(1976) proposed 
in the theoryof the agencyhow thecorporation canbe, given the assumptionthat 
managersare self-interested, andthe contextin whichmanagers do notbear thewealth 
effectsto taketheir own decisions.HoweverBerle& Means(1932) point out that the theoryis 
simple.Large corporationsare reduced to twoparticipant’sdirectors and 
shareholdersandthe interestsof eachone are supposed to beboth expensiveand 
consistent, in addition to consideringthe idea ofthat the human beingsmust be willing 
tosacrifice theirpersonalinterestsfortheinterestsof others. 
According toPratt &Zeckhauser(1985), the separationof ownership and controlis a subset 
of aseries of economic problemsthat can be classifiedas the "principal-agent problem", 
i.e.recognize thepossibility thatcreativityin thearea of governance, cando better.Ifthe 
agentis givenan income thatdoes not depend oneffort, has noeconomic incentive towork 
harder, in order toprovide security foraffectedinterests(Peng, 2010).Mahoney(2005) 
discusses theagency theory, whichmakessome predictionsfor the control, such as: 
 
1) Monitoringof lower qualityis expensive. 
2) Agencylossis more serious whenthe economic interestsofprincipals and 
agentsdiverge considerably. 
3) Agency theory issimplylimited controlor completelysuccessfulonthe company. 
4) The economic benefitsof reductionsin the loss ofthe agency aresharedby the 
principal andagentin mostmarket situations. 
5) The principal and the agenthave acommoneconomic interestin defininga 
structurefor monitoring andeconomicstimulusto produce resultsas closeas 
possible to theeconomic resultthat would occurif themonitoring informationwereno 
cost. 
 
Theprincipal-agenttheorygivesa good reason forthe existence ofsharecroppingcontracts. 
This bringsthe question:Why is there abigdifferencebetween theoryand 
practice?Somelimitationsof the model are: 
1) The costof specifyingcomplex relationships. 
2) Executivedirectorsare judgedbased on criteriathat could notbeset in advance 
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3) Reward restricted orsystem penalty, usually expressed in terms ofmonetary 
payments. 
 
The capital intensity,the degree of specializationof assets,information costs, capital 
markets andlabor marketsinternal and externalare examplesof factors in thecontracting 
environmentthat interact withmonitoring costsandbondingdifferentpracticesto 
determinecontractual forms(Jensen &Meckling, 1976, p. 350). 
Theagency relationshipis given tobe a contractunder whichone or more persons(the 
principals) hireanother person (theagent) toperform some serviceon their behalfwhich 
involvesdelegatingsomedecision makingauthoritytothe agent.In this casethe relationsof 
mostagencydirectors andagentsincur apositive controlof the economic costsof union 
andthere will be adivergence betweentheagent's decisionand the decisionsthat 
maximizethe economic welfare ofthe principal. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology usedfor thepreparation of thisresearch isbased onan empirical 
approachtoqualitative analysis, using electronic sources, literary and scientific, besides 
statistical databases of governmentalinformation. It was collectedinformation and 
consideredone thatfurnishandgiverise toanswer theproblem to be solved. This research 
report is consideredasa descriptive studybecause it examines howit is and manifestsa 
phenomenon andits components(Hernández Sampieri, 1991). 
 
The research is considering asthe independent variable the corporate governance as a 




ANALYSIS OF RESULT 
Researchhas developed awider and clearerappreciationof the role ofcorporate 
governance andits importance, leadingto consideras atoeto generatecompetitive 
advantages inthe market.For 2007, the newspaperEl Universal(2013) published an 
articlereferringtoSMEs thatremain outsidecorporate practicesinMexico.However, 
duringthe period 2007-2012the Ministry ofEconomy announcedthatadvancesand 
supportshave beenprovidedto SMEsthrough theNationalProgramof Promotion andaccess 
to Financefor SMEs (Secretaría de Economía,AdministraciónPúblicaFederal2006-
2012,2013), shown in Table2: 
 
Table2. Supports from the Secretary of Economics (Secretaría de Economía) to SMEs 
2007-2012 
Concept Annual data 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of SMEs  102,686 84,548 141,843 82,593 77,913 
Financial support from the 
Secretary of Economics (Millions 




Seed capital 1,590.0    433    849 1,379     000 
Productive projects 2,757.0 1,516    213 1,761     500 
Source: Own elaboration based on Secretaría de Economía(2013). 
 
Accordingto INEGI(2013), inMexicothere are3, 724, 019family businessesacross the 
country, of which 98.35% are concentrated intrade49.9% (1.85855 million), 
services36.7% (1,367,287) and industriesmanufacturing11.7% (436 851). 
Mexicodoesnot yetimplementcorporate governanceculturein SMEsdespitethat the 
government makesgreat efforts toreach theseeconomic entitiesthat arestrength 
andpillarof the Mexican economy. This is reflectedthrough theProgramfor BusinessDebt 
Marketthatis intended to fundthe institutionalizationand installation ofCorporate 
GovernanceinSMEs throughpayment ofprofessional services, equipment and systemsthat 
help strengthenthemsothat they becomeissuing debtcandidateson the Mexican 
StockExchange (BMV) (Observatorio PYME, 2013. SME Observatory, 2013). 
Note that forthe year2004was createdtheCenter for Excellence inCorporate 
Governance(CEGC), which aims to:Providingboard membersand executiveswith 
information,methodologies and bestcorporate governance practicesthat will increasethe 
efficiency andtransparencylevels, facilitate compliance withexisting standards andcreate 
more confidencefrom investorsto increasetheir economic valueand social(Centro de 
Excelencia de GobiernoCorporativo, Center for Excellence in Corporate Governance, 
2010, p. 2). 
The electronic journalof Public Accountingissuedby the Mexican Instituteof Public 
Accountantsin September 2010posted an articlethat talk about thecompetitive 
governmentby SMEs, highlighting their basic functionsin order toenable the organization 
tobemanaged and controlledefficiently,listed below: 
1) Auditfunction. 
2) Functionevaluation and compensation. 
3) Functionoffinance and planning. 
4) These functionsare carried outthrough twocontrol bodiesthat are: 
5) The Assemblyof Shareholders. 
6) The Board of Directors 
 
As part of theanalysisresults, it isnoted thatin 2010the companyapplied thefirst 
surveyPwCon Corporate GovernanceinMexico(EGC). It wasdone underspecific 
objectiveslisted below: 
1) Obtain relevant informationthat wouldconfirmthe current status of corporate 
governance (CG)practicesand identifyto what extent theculture and 
practicesofGC, have managed to permeatedifferent layersandMexican 
businesspositions. 
2) To know the form onhoware structured theGCbodiesheaded by theBoard of 
Directors andintermediate bodiesof support(Committees). 




4) To seekthe view pointsof the participantsin the survey,about areasofopportunityto 








Figure 2.Relationship betweencontrolfunctions andorgans 
Source: DeGarateLaraPerez&Tenorio(2010). 
 
The relationship betweenhorizontal and vertical sizecouldbe negativeifcoordination 



















ofequityownership,the effectshould predominateisdiversifiedrisk of shareholders.If 
theassetsizeis greater, maintaina certain proportionof ownership ofthe company toa 
shareholderrequires increasingthe riskthat the shareholderhas, thenit is higher the 
percentageof its equityposition in the company. Therefore, it isalsoexpecteda negative 
relationshipbetween heritage andownership concentration. 
 
1) Thethird-specific investments lead tomore negotiationand theneed for 
themanagerto have room tonegotiatemore freely. 
2) Costs of monitoringmanagers increase the likelihood ofagencybehavior, thereby 
increasingtheconcentration of ownership. 
3) Scale economies increasethe horizontal size ofthebusiness,making it moreriskyfor 
shareholdersowninga certain proportionoftheirheritage, thereby increasing the 
concentration of ownership. 
4) Theagency problemcan be mitigatedby concentrating theproperty. 
5) There should be norelationship,with the understanding thatsuchneedsarepart of 
compensation. 
6) External regulationsreplacecontrolling shareholders, thereby reducing the agency 
problemandthus theconcentration of ownership(De GarateLaraPerez&Tenorio, 
2010). 
 
A clearvision, mission and strategy is communicatedto shareholdersand 
repeatedfrequently. These elementsare sharedwith employeesfrom the point 
ofinterviewand inductioncreating auniformmentalityand performancetogether. Dynamic 
leadership is visionary and ableto stimulategood behaviorin the organization.This 
featureoccurs frequently inone person (thehighestexecutive), although 
teamworkisrecommended, especiallyto ensurecontinuityincase of rotationat the summit. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on thetarget set atthe beginning, theagency 
theorycanfosterentrepreneurialopportunism. However, it is necessary tolook forways to 
avoidthe opportunism proposing policies, regulations and penalties thatare established 
byagreement betweenmanagers, shareholders andthe board.Managersor agentsare 
directly responsiblefor effective functioningin the organization (Blair &Stout,2001). 
However it isfound thatthere isan area of opportunityfor future researchin relationto the 
influencethat exists betweenthetripod of governmentand performance ofthe company in 
questionfinancialand production processes. 
Corporate governanceis asource ofstrategies, but it is suggestedto considerrely 
onresearchersand professionalsexpertsto proposewaysofsupervision and 
counselingaimed toimproving the company.Corporate governanceprovidesthe 
organizationattributes, such as improvementin performance, strengthens the 
commitmentof work.There isgreater commitment andconfidence of participantsfrom 
across the organization, whichresults incontributing toorganizational effectivenessand 
efficiency, although theydo not fall intoextremes. 
A deficiency inthe issue hasbeen that theagency theorydoes not providemeaningful 
informationfor resourcesthat it can usethe boardeither behaviorsor strategiesthat can be 
implementedexternally tothe organization. This is the reason why it is suggested touse 
expertsin the area. 
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Recentlegislative and regulatory changesinMexicohave facilitated theability of 
shareholdersto participate inthe effortsof activists.These changesare fundamental tothe 
effectivenessof the management system, from the pointof viewof shareholders, as the 
effectiveness ofownership concentrationdependslargely onthe efficiency of 
thelegalsystemthat protectsproperty rightsof shareholders(Shleifer&Vishny, 1997). 
 
InMexico, SMEs have been affectedbythe industrial policiesof protectionism 
andindiscriminatelyopen borders. SMEsrequire refocusingtheir culturein order 
tosuccessfully meet thechallenges andopportunities that theenvironmentpresents, not to 
be displacedfrom internationalmarketsand maintain a goodposition on thenational level, 
tocreate apleasantwork environmentand reliablecommitmentto employees,customers, 
suppliers,etc.., withthe organization. The stakeholders shouldfeel to bepart of the 
organizationto achieve their goalsand attaincompetitivenessin the current 
environmentofglobalization (Gutiérrez Peñaloza,2003). 
SMEs need to develop the ability to act in an environment of constant change, 
competitive, participatory and internationally. In this environment,the manager or owner 
must be able to understand the political, social, economic, cultural, psychological and 
environmental. Therefore, it cannot be limitedtheperformance evaluationonly toeconomic 
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